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THE NEW ENLARGEMENT METHODOLOGY AND THE 
CONCLUSIONS OF THE ZAGREB SUMMIT
 Uroš ΔemaloviÊ *
Abstract: Montenegro and Serbia are stuck in the EU accession nego-
tiations, while, with Albania and North Macedonia, the perspective 
of their future course is very unclear. Between still relatively fl uid el-
ements of the new enlargement methodology presented in February 
2020 and quite a weak political impulse given by the Zagreb Declara-
tion adopted in May 2020, the potential accession to the EU of the four 
Western Balkans candidate countries remains not only uncertain, but 
seems even less realistic than it was after the Thessaloniki Summit 
in 2003. The paper shows how, just in the fi rst fi ve months of 2020, 
the path of the Western Balkans towards EU accession has managed 
to go one timid step forward and two solid steps back. First, some el-
ements of a novel approach to accession are encouraging, but remain 
imprecise, often inapplicable and subject to potential divergent inter-
pretation. Second, maintained top-down conditionality, combined with 
internal diffi culties of all Western Balkans countries and their high 
adjustment costs to meet membership criteria could lead to the crum-
bling of pro-European consensus and a decline of democracy. Finally, 
the Conclusions of the Zagreb Summit mentioned neither accession 
nor membership in the EU, confi rming the wavering political support 
for enlargement among Member States. The main methods used in the 
paper are content analysis and the comparative legal method, while 
the analysis of the Montenegrin and Serbian case provides evidence 
for the correlation between the weaknesses of the Zagreb Declaration 
and the hypothesised second step back in the accession process.
Keywords: EU enlargement, Western Balkans, conditionality, acces-
sion criteria, law approximation.
1 Introduction
From its very foundation, the European Economic Community 
(EEC) has been a project with an intrinsic capacity for enlargement. In 
spite of the fact that the provisions of the Treaty establishing the EEC did 
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not mention any substantial or procedural rules related to the accession 
of new Member States, it undoubtedly comprises a larger, pan-European 
perspective, given that the contracting parties were ‘calling upon the 
other peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join in their efforts’.1 The 
major political changes in Europe brought about by the fall of the Berlin 
wall and the reunifi cation of Germany have signifi cantly strengthened 
the importance of preparedness to integrate new Member States, while 
the big 2004 enlargement has proven the European Union’s (EU) desire 
to reconcile the principles of an ‘ever closer’ and ‘ever larger’ Union. 
However, for almost two decades, the so-called ‘European perspec-
tive of the Western Balkans countries’2 has remained a reiterated political 
declaration usually devoid of important consequences. The conclusions 
of the EU-Western Balkans Summit, held in Thessaloniki on 21 June 
2003, are still fully relevant, while it seems that enlargement fatigue, on 
the one hand, feeds ‘accession fatigue’, on the other. In such a context, on 
5 February 2020, the European Commission issued a Communication 
on ‘Enhancing the accession process − A credible EU perspective for the 
Western Balkans’,3 whose main objective was to propose a new enlarge-
ment methodology, while the Declaration4 adopted at the EU-Western 
Balkans Zagreb Summit,5 held via video conference on 6 May 2020, did 
not even mention the notion of membership in the EU. On the other hand, 
after lengthy negotiations and political bargaining between the Member 
States, the European Council, on 25 March 2020, fi nally granted the 
status of candidate country to Albania and North Macedonia,6 while the 
progress of Montenegro and Serbia in the accession negotiations with the 
EU during 2019 was very modest, with, respectively, no further chap-
ters provisionally closed or with only one chapter opened. Finally, even 
1 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (not published in the OJ), pre-
amble, para 8.
2 Thessaloniki Declaration of the EU-Western Balkans 2003 Summit, para 2. 
3 Commission Communication COM(2020) 57.
4 Declaration of EU-Western Balkans 2020 Summit <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/
media/43776/zagreb-declaration-en-06052020.pdf> accessed 15 May 2020.
5 The Zagreb Summit, initially planned for 6 and 7 May 2020, was fi rst postponed, but 
it was fi nally held via video conference on 6 May. In some of its offi cial documents and 
press releases, the Croatian government uses the notion of ‘Southeast Europe’ (see, for 
example <https://vlada.gov.hr/news/plenkovic-reviving-european-prospect-for-s-e-eu-
rope-will-be-croatian-presidency-s-big-legacy/28795> accessed 10 May 2020), while the 
European Commission, as the subtitle of its Communication COM(2020) 57 clearly indi-
cates, privileges the notion of ‘Western Balkans’. Without entering a complex and predom-
inantly meta-legal debate on this terminological distinction, this paper will use the term 
‘Western Balkans’; see also n 50.
6 In this paper, the author uses the denomination ‘North Macedonia’ (NM) as a stand-in for 
any other name North Macedonia has had over the last three decades; for more on the legal 
aspects of the Prespa Agreement that introduced this change, see n 18.
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if the multiple crises (unrelated to its enlargement policy) faced by the 
EU in the last few years (the migrant crisis, Brexit, the weakening of 
democracy in some Member States) have to a degree certainly contrib-
uted to enlargement fatigue, their impact will not be discussed, given 
that this falls outside the main scope of this paper. For methodological 
reasons, this paper will not analyse the (potential) accession of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and Kosovo, given that their candidacy status is still 
uncertain.
Between still relatively fl uid elements of the new enlargement meth-
odology and quite a weak political impulse given by the Zagreb Declara-
tion, the potential accession to the EU of the four Western Balkans can-
didate countries remains not only uncertain, but also subject to rules 
still to be clarifi ed. The objective of the fi rst part of this paper is to try 
and distil some elements of new conditionality and the potential positive 
features of the new enlargement methodology, while the second part ex-
amines why the recycled notion of ‘European perspective’, combined with 
some weaknesses of the new enlargement strategy, represents two steps 
back in EU-Western Balkans relations. 
The main methods used in the paper are content analysis and the 
comparative legal method, while the congruence analysis of the Monte-
negrin and Serbian case provides evidence for correlation between the 
weaknesses of the Zagreb Declaration and the hypothesised second step 
back in the accession process. The relevant national regulatory and ad-
ministrative frameworks of the candidate countries are mainly analysed 
under the auspices of political EU conditionality. 
2 One step forward: a potentially new impulse for enlargement 
After 1 July 2013 and the accession of Croatia, the EU’s enlargement 
has been facing numerous and ever-growing challenges. As a frontrun-
ner in terms of the number of negotiating chapters opened (32), Monte-
negro has been a candidate for EU accession for almost a decade,7 while, 
with Serbia, more than six years after the fi rst Intergovernmental Con-
ference, only half of the negotiating chapters have been opened.8 However 
lengthy and laborious the accession talks with these two countries may 
7 The Council confi rmed Montenegro as a candidate country on 17 December 2010, while 
the accession negotiations started on 29 June 2012; see also section 3.2; for more informa-
tion on Montenegro’s membership status and negotiating chapters opened and closed, see 
<https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/countries/detailed-country-informa-
tion/montenegro_en> accessed 11 May 2020.  
8 Serbia was confi rmed as a candidate country on 1 March 2013; see also section 3.2; for 
more information, see <https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/countries/de-
tailed-country-information/serbia_en> accessed 5 May 2020.
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seem, the examples of Albania and North Macedonia can give rise to 
even greater concern over the future of enlargement.
North Macedonia has offi cially been a candidate country from De-
cember 2005, while Albania, after the European Commission’s negative 
(2010) and highly conditional positive (2012) opinion, was awarded can-
didate status in June 2014. Without entering in the specifi c reasons for 
such a long period over which both countries (especially North Mace-
donia) have been candidates without any reachable perspective for the 
opening of accession negotiations, the fact that, in the second half of 
2019, a group of EU Member States (among others, France) blocked yet 
another attempt to launch the negotiations, has led some authors to 
conclude that ‘the enlargement process offi cially came to a standstill’.9 
However, after long-lasting political bargaining and a number of political 
declarations of different European leaders − often mutually confl icting 
and mostly aimed at fostering favourable public opinion in their own 
country − the Council, by its Conclusions adopted on 25 March 2020,10 
decided to open accession negotiations with North Macedonia and Al-
bania. The same Council Conclusions endorsed the European Commis-
sion’s Communication on the new enlargement methodology, published 
a month earlier. Those two facts combined may seem like an important 
positive impulse for the Union’s enlargement policy, but only if the Mem-
ber States manage to rebuild a consensual approach to enlargement, 
based on a common interpretation of the main political criteria. As a less 
formal structure, the Berlin process11 − initially designed to complement 
the existing EU-led mechanisms and relaunch relations with Western 
Balkans countries − could engender some political improvements, but 
remains impotent when it comes to consensus-building among the Mem-
ber States. 
Given that all the changes in the enlargement methodology pro-
posed by the Commission will be fully applicable only to Albania and 
North Macedonia − while the negotiating frameworks for Montenegro and 
Serbia will not be amended, ‘but the proposed changes could be accom-
modated within the existing frameworks […] with the agreement of these 
two countries’12 − all potential impacts of the new methodology would 
become fully evident during the accession negotiations. This assessment 
is reaffi rmed by the fact that the draft negotiating frameworks for Alba-
9 Richard Kraemer and Reuf Bajrovic, A New Anglo-American Partnership for the Western 
Balkans (USEurope Alliance 2020) 3.
10 General Affairs Council Conclusions of 25 March 2020 on Enlargement and Stabilisation 
and Association Process − the Republic of North Macedonia and the Republic of Albania.
11 See n 52.
12 Communication COM(2020) 57, 1.
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nia and North Macedonia, presented by the Commission on 1 July 2020, 
reiterate the main principles already introduced by the new enlargement 
methodology (credibility, predictability, stronger political steer, focus on 
fundamental reforms). It is therefore necessary to examine the aspects 
of the new enlargement methodology that could have a positive impact 
on the effectiveness of the future negotiation process (section 2.1), before 
turning to the question of potentially new conditionality stemming from 
both the new methodology and the Council’s decision to open accession 
negotiations with North Macedonia and Albania (section 2.2). Since we 
see the potential improvements brought about by the new enlargement 
methodology only as a function of their applicability in the future nego-
tiations, these two elements can only be treated as a single but unique 
step forward in EU-Western Balkans relations. 
2.1 Towards a more dynamic enlargement via the clustering of 
negotiating chapters 
The main features of the European Commission’s Communication 
on ‘Enhancing the accession process − A credible EU perspective for the 
Western Balkans’ are its proclamatory style and excessive use of pre-
scriptive (and often imprecise) formulations. It is based on four gener-
al principles detailed in its chapter ‘Reinvigorating the accession pro-
cess’, each dedicated to set out the ‘Commission’s concrete proposals for 
strengthening the whole accession process’.13 Apart from the focus on the 
political nature of the process, its stronger steering and enhanced cred-
ibility, the two elements of the new enlargement methodology of particu-
lar importance for future accession negotiations are: 1) the clustering of 
negotiating chapters; and 2) enhanced predictability, with positive and 
negative conditionality as a core element.
In the context of general and often bureaucratic formulations with 
which the Commission’s Communication overfl ows, the wish to contrib-
ute to making the accession process more dynamic by clustering nego-
tiating chapters is one of its most concrete, applicable and potentially 
benefi cial elements. As technical as it may seem at fi rst sight, the en-
tire procedure according to which the negotiating chapters are not only 
opened and closed, but also prioritised and internally structured, can be 
of great importance for the course of the entire negotiation process. 
As some authors have rightly remarked for the countries that are 
already in the negotiation process with the EU (Montenegro, Serbia), ‘re-
structuring of the negotiation chapters has brought forward the central-
ity of the rule of law and corresponding policy areas and has led to the 
13 ibid.
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modernising of legal systems of these countries’.14 On the other hand, 
the order in which the chapters are opened infl uences both the way the 
citizens (of both Member States and the candidate country) assess the 
progress of negotiations, but also determines its pace and priorities. For 
example, for the so-called ‘Helsinki group’ of candidate countries (Bul-
garia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania and Slovakia), ‘the strategic 
evolution of negotiation’15 was based on the principle that the easy chap-
ters are opened fi rst, in contrast to the case for Croatia, as well as for 
negotiations now taking place with Serbia and Montenegro, when the 
most diffi cult chapters (23 − Judiciary and Fundamental Rights and 24 
− Justice, Freedom and Security) are opened fi rst. Even if the principle 
of a separate opening (and closing) of each negotiating chapter has some 
important advantages − of which some of the most signifi cant are the fo-
cus on sector-specifi c national legislation and the involvement of experts 
− their clustering according to thematic criteria ‘has a great potential to 
make the entire negotiation more effective’.16 
The Communication proposes six big clusters of negotiating chap-
ters: 1) fundamentals (out of which the most prominent are Chapters 
23 and 24, but also those dedicated to public procurement, statistics 
and fi nancial control); 2) the internal market; 3) competitiveness and 
inclusive growth; 4) the green agenda and sustainable connectivity; 5) 
resources, agriculture and cohesion; and 6) external relations. By open-
ing and closing negotiations on each cluster as a whole, both the screen-
ing process and the examination of opening benchmarks will be carried 
out per cluster, avoiding certain overlapping and the so often criticised 
negotiation-related EU red tape. Moreover, the Communication provides 
that ‘priorities for accelerated integration and key reforms will be agreed 
between the EU and the candidate country’,17 allowing, in principle, an 
entire cluster to be opened without further conditions. When these prior-
ities have been suffi ciently addressed, the cluster (covering all associat-
ed chapters) should be opened without further conditions, while closing 
benchmarks are set for each chapter.
Notwithstanding some of the potential diffi culties related to this new 
principle (which will be examined in part 3), it may provide important 
economies of time and resources, giving the entire enlargement process 
14 Christophe Paulussen and others (eds), Fundamental Rights in International and Europe-
an Law: Public and Private Law Perspectives (Asser Press-Springer 2016) 3.
15 Melania-Gabriela Ciot, Negotiation and Foreign Policy Decision Making (Cambridge Schol-
ar Publishing 2014) 199.
16 Uroš ΔemaloviÊ, ‘Towards a New Strategy for EU Enlargement: Between the Wish for 
Encouragement, the Reality of the Fatigue, and the Threat of a Dead End’ (2020) 4 EU and 
Comparative Law Issues and Challenges (ECLIC) 281.
17 Commission Communication (2020) 57, 5.
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a better image in the eye of the public. This is particularly important for 
North Macedonia, considering that the decision to open accession nego-
tiations was adopted more than fourteen years after the country gained 
the status of candidate country. Over that period, the country faced nu-
merous challenges, including times of political instability and the diffi -
cult compromise over identity and long-standing issues with Greece,18 as 
well as some recurrent linguistic and historical issues with Bulgaria.19      
2.2 Some elements of a new conditionality 
While, according to some authors, ‘EU conditionality is most often 
identifi ed with limited, discrete instances of infl uence’,20 others observe 
that, in some countries of the Western Balkans, ‘EU conditionality has 
effectively contributed to the consolidation of […] detrimental gover-
nance patterns’.21 However, it certainly remains one of the most import-
ant mechanisms to achieve the (at least formal) alignment of candidate 
countries with the standards necessary for membership. One of the most 
important vectors of this alignment is approximation of laws, aiming to 
‘eliminate the inconsistent differences in national legislations’,22 an EU 
policy applicable to both Member States and candidate countries. How-
ever, the notion of conditionality related to EU enlargement is an over-
arching concept, representing ‘the core element of the merit-based ac-
18 In June 2018, the so-called Prespa Agreement settled a long-lasting dispute between 
Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Greece was vigorously 
against the use of the denomination ‘Macedonia’, given that its northern region (with Thes-
saloniki as capital) historically uses the same name; for more on the legal aspects of the 
Prespa Agreement, see <http://www.qil-qdi.org/the-prespa-agreement-between-greece-
and-north-macedonia-and-the-settlement-of-the-name-dispute-of-objective-regimes-erga-
omnes-obligations-and-treaty-effects-on-third-parties/> accessed 13 May 2020.    
19 In the former Yugoslavia, Macedonian was fully recognised as one of the offi cial lan-
guages. On the other hand, mainly by invoking identity-related argumentation, numerous 
Bulgarian scientists and politicians (including some Bulgarian MEPs) repeatedly claimed 
that the Macedonian language is only a dialect of Bulgarian. The solution is expected to 
be brought by a bilateral commission, competent to reach a common interpretation of 
historical and linguistic issues. For more details on the possibility that Bulgaria blocks 
the accession of North Macedonia over this issue, see <https://europeanwesternbalkans.
com/2020/05/18/could-bulgaria-block-the-eu-path-of-n-macedonia-over-common-histo-
ry-interpretation/> accessed 14 May 2020.
20 Mario Zucconi, EU Infl uence Beyond Conditionality: Turkey Plus/Minus the EU (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2020) 19.
21 Solveig Richter and Natasha Wunsch, ‘Money, Power, Glory: The Linkages between EU 
Conditionality and State Capture in the Western Balkans’ (2020) 27 Journal of European 
Public Policy 41.
22 Uroš ΔemaloviÊ, ‘Framework for the Approximation of National Legal Systems with the 
European Union’s Acquis: From a Vague Defi nition to Jurisprudential Implementation’ 
(2015) 11 Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy 241.
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cession process’.23 In the same vein, the Commission’s intention to bring 
more predictability in the relations with candidate countries − through, 
on the one hand, better defi ned positive and, on the other, the introduc-
tion of negative conditionality − is one of the strongest features of the 
Commission’s new enlargement methodology. It is therefore necessary to 
examine the general framework of the potentially new concept of condi-
tionality stemming from the Communication of 5 February 2020, before 
turning to the question of how this framework might interact with the 
set of concrete conditions detailed in the Council’s decision of 25 March 
2020 to open accession negotiations with North Macedonia and Albania.
Without mentioning expressis verbis that one of the main reasons 
for the adoption of a new enlargement methodology is the relatively mod-
est success of the accession negotiation process − and in spite of the 
fact that the Western Balkan countries have been subject to reinforced 
conditionality compared to that applied in earlier enlargements − it is 
clear that the Commission is fully aware of the absence of ‘clarity on 
what the Union expects of enlargement countries at different stages of 
the process’.24 In other words, conditionality is applicable to every phase 
of the relations between the EU and the (potential) candidate country, 
but it becomes crucial when the accession negotiations effectively start. 
Therefore, the new methodology fi rst strives to improve the effectiveness 
of positive conditionality, and then to introduce the possibility to halt 
or reverse the accession process if there is ‘any serious or prolonged 
stagnation or even backsliding in reform implementation’.25 The potential 
impact of negative conditionality is reinforced by the ‘fundamentals fi rst’ 
approach, given that unsatisfactory reforms in crucial (legal and polit-
ical) fi elds could undermine the progress of negotiations in numerous 
other (mainly economical) areas. 
The Commission’s annual reports are seen as the most appropriate 
way to better defi ne the conditions set for candidate countries to prog-
ress, while those conditions ‘must be objective, precise, detailed, strict 
and verifi able’.26 However, what is actually worrying at this point is the 
potential lack of uniform interpretation by the Commission (and the 
Member States) of whether some conditions are met or not. In the con-
text of refurbished authoritarian tendencies in some EU countries and 
from the point of view of what is referred to as ‘illiberal democracy’,27 how, 
for example, would the condition related to the freedom of the media be 




27 See n 49. 
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interpreted by various stakeholders? Back in 2018, as it was pertinently 
remarked for Albania by Kristina Irion and Tarik Jusi , ‘conditionality 
mechanisms failed to ensure absence of political and fi nancial pressures 
on the media’.28 This conclusion is still fully applicable to many other 
countries of the Western Balkans, including Montenegro, North Macedo-
nia and Serbia. Notwithstanding that a better-defi ned positive condition-
ality is crucial for clearer guidance and more effective accession negotia-
tions, it is not easily applicable in all negotiation clusters, and especially 
in those that are more related to political criteria. 
Even if it may seem a measure introducing a punitive component 
to the mechanism of conditionality, and in spite of certain opinions see-
ing it as an element of ‘balance between rewards and threats’,29 nega-
tive conditionality, as exposed in Communication (2020) 57, is a suitable 
counterpart of clearer and better defi ned positive conditionality. Halting 
or reversing the accession process could also be a suitable way to send a 
clear message to the public in the candidate country about the results of 
their political leadership in membership negotiations with the EU. This 
could be particularly appropriate when the approximation (and adequate 
implementation) of national legislation with the EU acquis is in question. 
However, once again, here the same already-mentioned problem arises in 
the context of positive conditionality: the uniform interpretation of some 
(mainly political) criteria.
When examined in the context of what has previously been said on 
positive and negative conditionality in the new enlargement methodolo-
gy, the Council Conclusions of 25 March 2020 on the accession of North 
Macedonia and Albania (as well as the negotiating frameworks presented 
by the Commission on 1 July 2020), at least theoretically, open equally 
large space for both the acceleration and slowing down of the acces-
sion negotiations. Notwithstanding the fact that the Council’s decision as 
such represents a positive impulse, the lengthy and laborious process of 
consensus-building among the Member States regarding the opening of 
accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia clearly indi-
cates that the political encouragement desired by the Commission is not 
always followed by the Member States. However, it seems that the way 
the Council defi ned the conditions to be fulfi lled by Albania prior to the 
fi rst intergovernmental conference respects, at least generally, the con-
ditions of objectivity and precision demanded by the new enlargement 
strategy, while the criteria related to verifi ability and uniform interpreta-
28 Kristina Irion and Tarik JusiÊ (eds), Media Constrained by Context: International Assis-
tance and the Transition to Democratic Media in the Western Balkans (Central European 
University Press 2018) 280. 
29 Eli Gateva, European Union Enlargement Conditionality (Palgrave Macmillan 2016) 59. 
188 Uroš ΔemaloviÊ: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: The EU and the Western Balkans...
tion can only be assessed in the future course of the accession process. 
Some of the most important issues to be resolved are: 1) the adoption of 
electoral reform ‘ensuring transparent fi nancing of political parties and 
electoral campaigns’;30 2) continued implementation of judicial reform, 
‘including ensuring the functioning of the Constitutional Court and the 
High Court, taking into account relevant international expertise includ-
ing applicable opinions of the Venice Commission’;31 3) fi nalisation of ‘the 
establishment of the anti-corruption and organised crime specialised 
structures’;32 4) further strengthening of the fi ght against corruption and 
organised crime; and 5) tackling the phenomenon of unfounded asylum 
applications. 
On the other hand, the GA Council Conclusions related to North 
Macedonia do not mention any specifi c issue to be resolved before the 
fi rst intergovernmental conference, but simply invite the Commission ‘to 
continue to monitor the progress and continued compliance in all ar-
eas of the conditions identifi ed by the Council in June 2018 related to 
the opening of negotiations’,33  as well as ‘to carry out and complete the 
process of analytical examination of the EU acquis’.34 While clearly de-
fi ned criteria in the fi eld of justice, freedom, security, fundamental rights 
and the judiciary (now belonging to a unique cluster 1), as well as the 
planned screening carried out per cluster, could signifi cantly speed up 
the future negotiations with Albania, the strict application of the princi-
ple of negative conditionality could, on the other hand, considerably slow 
it down. For North Macedonia, the focus will be on the approximation 
of national legislation with the EU acquis, an area in which signifi cant 
acceleration could be expected due to cluster-based screening. However, 
in the absence of clearer guidelines in the draft negotiating framework 
regarding criteria related to the rule of law, this potential positive effect 
could be seriously compromised.
3 Two steps back: a strategy without substance and a ‘perspective’ 
without accession  
Analysed as a whole, the new enlargement methodology presented 
on 5 February 2020 is excessively prescriptive, generally imprecise and 
− even more than usual for the EU’s bureaucratic jargon − impregnat-
ed with proclamatory formulations often devoid of substance and appli-
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cability. As the previous part of the paper demonstrated, its two main 
positive aspects − with, however, quite a few elements of uncertainty re-
garding their future interpretation and enforcement − are the clustering 
of negotiating chapters and modifi ed conditionality, but they are far from 
suffi cient to proclaim a new era of EU enlargement. On the other hand, 
the Zagreb Declaration adopted at the EU-Western Balkans Summit on 
6 May 2020 did not even mention the term ‘accession’, insisting, 17 years 
after the Thessaloniki Declaration, on yet another use of the fl uid term 
of ‘European perspective’. In this way, the timid one step ahead achieved 
by concrete and applicable elements of the new enlargement strategy has 
been largely nullifi ed by the lack of both ‘technical’ and political sub-
stance. First to be examined here are the weaknesses of the Commis-
sion’s strategy (section 3.1), before turning to the issue of how the Coun-
cil failed to give a stronger impulse to the accession process (section 3.2).
3.1 The fi rst step back: an enlargement methodology devoid of 
substance and applicability
The three main negative features of the Commission’s Communica-
tion on the new enlargement methodology are imprecision, lack of sub-
stance and questionable applicability. While its proclamatory style and 
excessive use of prescriptive formulations could, to some extent, be jus-
tifi ed by its general nature, its wording is obviously the fruit of laborious 
political bargaining, where the search for the smallest common denomi-
nator has led to empty political verbiage. The word ‘credible’ or ‘credibili-
ty’ is mentioned 12 times, the accession process as such has to be ‘rein-
vigorated’, support for the European perspective of the Western Balkans 
is ‘unequivocal’, while an ‘accession perspective’ is ‘the key incentive and 
driver’ of transformation in the region. When it comes to the excessive 
use of prescriptive formulations, the noun ‘commitment’ is mentioned 
seven times; the Western Balkans leaders ‘must deliver more credibly’, 
while ‘both sides should show more leadership’. However, the weaknesses 
of the new methodology can best be demonstrated by a closer analysis of 
its two main intentions: 1) the wish for a more politicised accession; and 
2) the focus on a merit-based process.
In previous waves of enlargement, the entire procedure of accession 
to the EU was fundamentally ‘a very technical matter, left to the high-
ly sub-specialised and initiated experts’35 and, consequently, often very 
distant from the citizens of both Member States and candidate countries. 
This is particularly evident in matters related to eminently economic 
issues, when negotiations about certain topics can easily transform into 
35 ΔemaloviÊ (n 16) 290.
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‘marathons of experts’.36 This is why Communication (2020) 57 rightly 
points out that, from the standpoint of candidate countries, accession 
‘is not moving on autopilot but must refl ect an active societal choice’,37 
while, on the side of the Member States, it should be seen as a ‘signifi cant 
political and not simply technical undertaking’.38 This observation would 
have been a good starting point for a substantial reform of enlargement 
methodology provided that: 
the Commission had accompanied it with more substantial proposi-
tions on how to better involve the citizens (of both member states and 
candidate countries), in order to present them why the EU should be 
an active societal choice and a matter of interest for both parties. Es-
pecially after the COVID-19 outbreak, it would be increasingly diffi cult 
to explain to citizens why the continuation of the enlargement process 
and integration of the new member states would be a better political 
choice than refurbished national sovereignty, more border control and 
less supra-national solidarity and cooperation. Instead, the Commis-
sion proposes more planning, stronger leadership and a more solid in-
stitutional structure. All these elements are undoubtedly important, 
but it is inappropriate to insist on societal choice and not exclusively 
the technical nature of the enlargement, while proposing reinvigorated 
politicisation and a more top-down approach.39
Conditionality is still the main mechanism to ensure the mer-
it-based accession process while, according to the Commission, acces-
sion itself has to refl ect ‘an active societal choice’40 in the countries aspir-
ing to join. As indicated in section 2.2, the new enlargement methodology 
introduces negative conditionality, as well as some new elements for a 
better defi nition of positive conditionality; through its interaction with 
the clustering of negotiating chapters, the main incentive for accession 
countries would be the perspective of accelerated accession. In the same 
vein, the key to success of the entire concept of conditionality lies in 
clearly defi ned benchmarks that are suffi ciently detailed and not sub-
ject to divergent interpretations. Though when it comes to EU-Western 
Balkans relations, ‘conditionality is not just an enlargement tool [but] a 
political multi-dimensional and multi-purpose instrument of EU Foreign 
and Security Policy’.41 
36 Matthieu Trouvé, L’Espagne et l’Europe: de la dictature de Franco à l’Union européenne 
(Peter Lang 2008) 440.
37 Communication COM(2020) 57, 3.
38 ibid.
39 ΔemaloviÊ (n 16) 290. 
40 Communication COM(2020) 57, 5.
41 Jehona Lushaku Sadriu, Europeanization through Conditionality and Deliberation in the 
EU Enlargement Process (Lit Verlag 2019) 20.
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Given that all the decisions related to each phase of the accession 
process are adopted by unanimity, numerous positive aspects of clus-
tering and the better approach to conditionality can be entirely counter-
balanced by a divergent opinion of a single Member State, having either 
a different assessment on the progress of a candidate country or, even 
worse, its own interpretation of certain conditions. The picture becomes 
even more complicated if one adheres to the opinion that conditionality 
is, at least partially, an instrument of the Union’s Foreign and Security 
Policy (FSP). In spite of the fact that Communication (2020) 57 specifi es 
that ‘the Commission will better defi ne the conditions set for candidates 
to progress, in particular through its annual reports’,42 nothing prevents 
any Member State − as we have already seen in the case of North Mace-
donia43 − from introducing their own conditions, especially if the en-
largement-related issue overlaps with some objectives of the FSP.44
Not only that − in the absence of clearer guidelines regarding the 
uniform interpretation of the conditions set for candidates to progress − 
the new enlargement methodology might become entirely inapplicable. At 
the same time, its wish to provide ‘clear and tangible incentives of direct 
interest to citizens’45 and to ‘encourage real political will’46 could become 
entirely pointless due to the opposition of a single Member State. Finally, 
some authors believe that ‘top-down conditionality has weakened politi-
cal competition and mechanisms of internal accountability and deliber-
ation’,47 allowing ‘linkages between EU conditionality and state capture’ 
42 Communication COM(2020) 57, 5.
43 See also n 18.
44 This might represent a signifi cant issue, especially for Serbia, whose intention to join the 
EU is heavily compromised by its special relations with Russia and China. Moreover, in this 
candidate country, accession to the EU is quite far from being ‘an active societal choice’. In 
spite of the results of regular surveys of public opinion published by the country’s Ministry 
of European Integration − which, in general, show that more than 50% of respondents sup-
port membership in the EU  − the overwhelming majority of national media, as well as dec-
larations of numerous political decision-makers actively promote a Euro-sceptic, often an-
ti-European, agenda; it was particularly evident during the crisis caused by the COVID-19 
outbreak, during which relatively modest Chinese support and aid was labelled as ‘brother-
ly aid showing steel-solid friendship’, while the substantial aid of the EU was either totally 
ignored or designated as ‘minimal and belated’. For the December 2019 results of opinion 
polls published twice a year by the Serbian Ministry of European Integration, see <https://
www.mei.gov.rs/upload/documents/nacionalna_dokumenta/istrazivanja_javnog_mnjen-
ja/opinion_pool_dec_19.pdf> accessed 16 May 2020; for an overview regarding the EU’s 
and Chinese assistance to Serbia during the crisis caused by the COVID-19 outbreak, 
see <https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2020/03/30/steel-friendship-between-ser-
bia-and-china-criticised-by-european-commentators/> accessed 17 May 2020.
45 Communication COM(2020) 57, 5.
46 ibid.
47 Richter and Wunsch (n 21) 41.
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to be established.48 In any case, while legal and economic conditionality 
could rarely be subject to divergent interpretations, political conditional-
ity is much more problematic, especially in the context of the weakening 
democracy in some EU Member States.49      
3.2 The second step back: yet another ‘perspective of a 
perspective’
The crucial incentive for the integration of the Western Balkan50 
countries into the EU was given at the Thessaloniki Summit in June 
2003. At that moment, the potential candidates were Albania, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Croatia, North Macedonia,51 Serbia and Montenegro 
(as a federal state). Seventeen years later, after an impressive number of 
summits and other offi cial meetings in various formats,52 only Croatia 
has become an EU Member State, Albania and North Macedonia have 
recently become candidates, while Montenegro and Serbia (from 2006, 
two independent states) have, for quite a long time, been in the accession 
negotiation process. Apart from Croatia − whose relatively swift53 acces-
sion seems to play the role of the exception that confi rms the rule − the 
48 ibid.
49 For Hungary, see András Pap, Democratic Decline in Hungary: Law and Society in an Il-
liberal Democracy (Routledge 2019); for a wider comparative overview, see Aldo Madariaga, 
Neoliberal Resilience: Lessons in Democracy and Development from Latin America and East-
ern Europe (Princeton University Press 2020).  
50 See also n 5. The question of which countries of Southeastern Europe actually belong 
to the Western Balkans was (and, to a certain extent, still is) the subject of disagreement 
both in theory and among politicians, the main issue being the place of Croatia; as for the 
Thessaloniki Declaration, it clearly includes this country. For a comprehensive study on 
the place of different ex-Yugoslav countries in various regional clusters, see Sabine Rutar 
(ed), Beyond the Balkans − Towards an Inclusive History of Southeastern Europe (Lit Berlin 
2014).
51 The country’s name at that time was the Republic of Macedonia; in international fora 
and due to the opposition of Greece, the denomination ‘the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia’ was used. See nn 6 and 18.
52 In addition to the regular EU-Western Balkans summits, the so-called Berlin process was 
initiated in 2014, ‘an initiative aimed at stepping up regional cooperation in the Western 
Balkans and aiding the integration of these countries into the European Union’ (<https://
berlinprocess.info/about/#wbsummits> accessed 21 May 2020); until now, after the Berlin 
Summit in 2014 another fi ve summits have been held. The process is supported by the 
European Commission; however, it offi cially does not involve the EU institutions, but only 
the representatives of six Member States (Austria, Croatia, France, Germany, Italy and 
Slovenia) and the UK.
53 Croatia’s accession could certainly not be defi ned as ‘swift’ when compared with the 1995 
and previous enlargements. However, when we compare it with the results achieved so far 
in the accession negotiations of Montenegro and Serbia, Croatian accession certainly merits 
being characterised as reasonably rapid. Croatia managed to open and close all negotiating 
chapters in less than six years, while Montenegro’s and Serbia’s accession negotiations, 
until now, have lasted more than eight and six years, respectively. 
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EU enlargement to the Western Balkans has been a failure. After the 
conclusions of the last EU-Western Balkans Zagreb Summit of 6 May 
2020, it is very likely to remain so. 
On the one hand, the political and legal problems related to acces-
sion have not been remedied over the last years, while, on the other, the 
Zagreb Summit has failed to bring a stronger impulse for enlargement. 
To use the expression cherished by the Commission, the cross-fertilisa-
tion54 of these two negative elements (the mainly unsuccessful past and a 
very uncertain future) could be detrimental to the future of enlargement. 
Moreover, the Zagreb Summit takes a step back in comparison to previ-
ous EU-Western Balkans summits because, unlike some other summits, 
it failed to initiate concrete models of mutual cooperation between the 
candidate and potential candidate countries of the region. For example, 
the Declaration adopted at the Paris Western Balkans Summit, held in 
July 2016, not only mentioned the commitment of the accession coun-
tries ‘to abstain from misusing outstanding bilateral issues in the EU 
accession process’,55 but also launched the Regional Youth Cooperation 
Offi ce.56
Given that the accession-related vicissitudes of Albania and North 
Macedonia were examined in part 2, the focus now will fi rst be on the two 
candidates that are already in negotiations, before turning to the conclu-
sions of the Zagreb Summit. Taking into consideration the internal polit-
ical, administrative and economic diffi culties in Montenegro and Serbia, 
the clearer incentive of membership offered ‘in last enlargement rounds’57 
would lead both to stronger EU infl uence in those countries and to more 
incentivised reforms. This is exactly the point where the conclusions of 
the Zagreb Summit omitted to send a clear political message. 
Montenegro’s accession negotiations started in June 2012; eight 
years later, the country has 32 (out of 33) negotiating chapters opened, 
and only three provisionally closed. The last Commission Report58 esti-
54 According to Communication COM (2020) 57, ‘further dynamism’ should be injected 
into the accession process and ‘cross-fertilisation’ of efforts fostered; the only practical and 
concrete consequence of such ‘cross-fertilisation’ of efforts is the organisation of negotiating 
chapters in thematic clusters; see section 2.1.
55 Final Declaration by the Chair of the Paris Western Balkans Summit, para 2 <https://
ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/fi les/pdf/policy-highlights/region-
al-cooperation/20160713-01.fi nal-declaration-by-the-chair-of-the-paris-western-balkans-
summit.pdf> accessed 6 July 2020.    
56 ibid, para 3. 
57 Rachel Epstein and Ulrich Sedelmeier (eds), International Infl uence Beyond Conditionali-
ty: Postcommunist Europe after EU Enlargement (Routledge 2009) 4.
58 European Commission, 2019 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy, 2019 Monte-
negro Report.
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mates that, as far as the political criteria are concerned, the situation 
in the country is far from being satisfactory (a polarised and fragmented 
political scene, the absence of dialogue, parliamentary accountability), 
while, as regards governance, transparency is still an issue, and the 
country is ‘moderately prepared’ with the reform of its public administra-
tion. The approximation of national laws with the EU acquis is satisfac-
tory only in some areas (company law, intellectual property law, energy, 
and foreign, security and defence policy), while it is still lagging behind 
in numerous important areas, such as environment, agriculture and ru-
ral development, the movement of goods, and competition. With a better 
prepared public administration, but also some similar structural diffi -
culties related to economic and environmental issues, Croatia managed 
to open and close all negotiating chapters in less than six years.59
More than six years after the fi rst EU-Serbia Intergovernmental Con-
ference,60 only eighteen negotiating chapters have been opened and two 
provisionally closed. According to the last Report of the Commission,61 
the political situation is characterised by the lack of ‘broad pro-Europe-
an consensus’62 and, more generally, the absence of suffi cient cross-par-
ty debate. Public administration and, even more, the judiciary, still need 
to be signifi cantly strengthened and reformed, while the country’s ability 
to attract and retain qualifi ed staff in EU-related issues is very limited 
and its fi ght against corruption mainly unsatisfactory. Approximation of 
the national legal system with the EU acquis is good in some areas (com-
pany law, intellectual property law, transport policy, customs), while, in 
many others, progress is either limited (public procurement, statistics, 
social policy, employment) or there is even non-compliance with the Sta-
bilisation and Association Agreement (state aid control, fi scal discrimi-
nation and restriction of competition in some areas). However, the most 
prominent characteristic of Serbia’s relation with the EU is the fact that 
its membership in the Union is far from being ‘an active societal choice’ 
of its citizens, and of its political and intellectual elites.63
Held during the peak of the global crisis caused by the COVID-19 
pandemic, and only a month after the status of candidate countries was 
granted to Albania and North Macedonia, expectations from the EU-West-
ern Balkans Zagreb Summit were high. Beyond its importance for the 
59 The screening stage of accession negotiations began on 20 October 2005, while the last 
negotiating chapter was closed on 30 June 2011. 
60 The fi rst EU-Serbia Intergovernmental Conference was held on 21 January 2014, and the 
fi rst negotiating chapter opened almost two years later (14 December 2015); the last, 18th, 
negotiating chapter was opened on 10 December 2019.
61 Commission, 2019 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy, 2019 Serbia Report.
62 ibid 3.
63 See n 44.
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future of EU enlargement, the Summit was also an occasion to reposition 
the Union as one of the crucial stakeholders in international relations. In 
all current candidate countries − and especially in North Macedonia and 
Serbia − a clear membership perspective is crucial for the success of the 
political and legal transformations necessary for accession. As rightly 
noted by Epstein and Sedelmeier, ‘in the last enlargement rounds, the 
EU has offered […] the incentive of membership, [while] in the current 
candidates, the conditions are much less conducive for this incentive to 
result in strong EU infl uence’.64 Moreover, ‘most of the remaining can-
didate countries face much higher domestic adjustment costs to meet 
the EU’s political conditionality’,65 while in some of them, as noted by 
the Commission,66 pro-European consensus is crumbling and freedom of 
the media threatened. In such a context, the Conclusions of the Zagreb 
Summit mentioned neither accession nor membership in the EU, recy-
cling the usual political verbiage, characterised by yet another mention 
of ‘unequivocal support for the European perspective of the Western Bal-
kans’. Taking into consideration ever growing legal, economic and politi-
cal conditionality, combined with the internal diffi culties of the Western 
Balkan countries mainly related to political instability, corruption and 
the independence of the judiciary, a clear perspective of membership, 
and not just ‘a perspective of a perspective’, would be suffi cient political 
incentive. Given that in every phase of negotiation, progress in accession 
is thoroughly assessed, allowing every Member State to evaluate whether 
the requirements of the accession process are met, it is disappointing to 
see the extent to which the Zagreb Summit, seventeen years after Thes-
saloniki, missed the opportunity to take a step off the beaten track of 
wavering political support for enlargement.
4 Conclusion
During the fi rst half of 2020, the issue of EU enlargement was treat-
ed on three important occasions. First, in February, the European Com-
mission published a new enlargement methodology, striving to enhance 
accession, by bringing more credibility, predictability and dynamism to 
the process. Second, in March, the European Council − after a long period 
of uncertainty and political bargaining − granted the status of candidate 
country to Albania and to North Macedonia, while the draft negotiating 
frameworks for those two countries were presented by the Commission 
on 1 July 2020. Finally, the EU-Western Balkans Zagreb Summit, held 
in May, expressed its ‘unequivocal support for the European perspec-
64 Epstein and Sedelmeier (n 57) 4.
65 ibid.
66 See n 58.
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tive of the Western Balkans’, but did not mention the terms ‘accession’ 
or ‘membership’. While some elements of a novel approach to accession 
and the potential positive features of a new enlargement methodology for 
the two new candidate countries could be assessed as a potential step 
forward, this was entirely counterbalanced by the maintained top-down 
conditionality with more planning, stronger leadership and an institu-
tional structure further discouraging citizen participation. It is therefore 
very unlikely that the new enlargement methodology will contribute to 
accession as an ‘active societal choice’ and not simply a ‘technical under-
taking’. Finally, the internal diffi culties of all Western Balkans countries 
and their high adjustment costs to meet the EU’s political conditionality 
have often led to crumbling pro-European consensus and continue to 
undermine it. In such a context, the empty political verbiage of the Za-
greb Declaration and yet another ‘perspective of a perspective’ refl ect the 
wavering political support for enlargement among Member States, mak-
ing its future if not impossible, then very uncertain.
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